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Kostwinnersmodellen en historische modellen. Transities in arbeidsverhoudingen en
arbeidsmarkten in België, 19de en 20ste eeuw
Het ‘kostwinnersmodel’ is een geïntegreerd concept dat vraagt om een geïntegreerde
benadering op de drie maatschappelijke niveau’s: micro (de kostwinnersfamilie), meso (de kostwinning
op de werkvloer) en macro (de kostwinnersideologie). Een gecombineerde kijk op de interactie tussen
individuele en gezinsstrategieën en tussen arbeidsmarkten en overheidspolitiek is noodzakelijk. 
Ons onderzoek beoogt de constructie en deconstructie van een kostwinnersmodel in de context van de
Belgische en Vlaamse samenleving. Ik concentreer mij op de ‘timing’ van de historische tijd, zoals
gedefinieerd door Tamara Hareven: ‘de bredere processen aan dewelke de tijdsspecifieke
familiepatronen zijn gekoppeld’.
De geschiedenis van de arbeid tussen 1750 en 2000 wordt gemarkeerd door drie periodes van transitie,
die de contouren van de arbeidsorganisatie vastleggen voor de volgende ‘eeuw’. 
Vanaf de tweede helft van de 18de eeuw, parallel met de economische veranderingen getypeerd als de
‘eerste industriële revolutie’, verslechteren de arbeids- en inkomensperspectieven in zowel de stedelijke
als de rurale samenlevingen. Dit  beperkt de marges van de gezinsvorming. Ondanks de intensifiëring
van de arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen en kinderen is het evenwicht in het gezinsbudget fragieler dan
ooit tevoren. De geleidelijke vervanging van een familiegebonden productiemodel door een open en
onzekere arbeidsmarkt blokkeert voor een groeiend aantal volwassenen de perspectieven op huwelijk en
gezinsvorming. In stedelijke samenlevingen worden de beschermende functies van de familiebanden
meer en meer vervangen door bredere overlevingsnetwerken.
Het ‘extensieve’ productiemodel van de eerste industriële revolutie, steunend op lage lonen en een snelle
vervanging van arbeid, put de arbeidskracht uit en tast de reproductieve kracht van de gezinnen aan.
Vanaf het einde van de 19de eeuw wordt deze flessenhals opgeheven door de overgang naar meer
‘intensieve’ modellen gebaseerd op hogere mannelijke lonen, een beschermende wetgeving (die vrouwen
en kinderen uit de sterke en zichtbare industriële sectoren weert), een betere scholing, een betere
behuizing en hygiëne. De huisvrouw is gedwongen zich terug te trekken in de onbeschermde/informele
niches van de arbeidsmarkt, zoals huishoudelijke diensten, onderaanneming en landbouw. De uitbouw
van een publiek transfersysteem van kinderbijslagen en belastingvoordelen is de finale stap in de
realisatie van de mythe van het kostwinnersloon. De huwelijksmarkt breekt open, gevolgd door een
beperking van de vruchtbaarheidsratio.
Vanaf de jaren 1960 verschijnen (gehuwde) vrouwen terug op de formele arbeidsmarkt, in de eerste
plaats in de nieuwe industrieën en de diensten. Deze herintrede gaat echter gepaard met een deregulering
van de arbeidsmarkt door een toename van onregelmatig en tijdelijke jobs. De huwelijksvruchtbaarheid
gaat nog verder achteruit, samen met het terugdringen van de ‘traditionele’ gezinspatronen.
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De 19de eeuw wordt gekenmerkd door een steeds meer ingrijpende deregulering, binnen
familieverbanden, op de werkvloer, in het overheidsbeleid. Het vrijmaken van de arbeidsmarkt wordt
onderbouwd door een offensieve ideologie van arbeidsdisciplinering. Het einde van de eeuw markeert
een verandering in de richting van een (20ste-eeuws) model van regulering: beschermende maatregelen
op de werkvloer en een nieuwe ideologie van het kostwinner/huisvrouw-model gaan samen met een
hechter gereguleerde arbeidsorganisaztie (Taylorisme-Fordisme). Dit komt opnieuw op losse schroeven
te staan vanaf het laatste kwart van de 20ste eeuw, wanneer nieuwe vormen van flexibele productie
ondersteund worden door een minder stringente arbeidsregulering, een fragmentatie van de collectieve
samenlevingsvormen, een individualisering van consumptie en een commercialisering van de vrije tijd.
Het ‘kostwinnersmodel’ in België is verbonden met een specifieke wijziging in de ‘historisch tijd’, een
verandering die een hoge publieke welvaart koppelt aan een stringente arbeidsregulering en massieve
fincanciele overheidstranfers.
Eric Vanhaute was born in 1959 and obtained his Ph.D in 1989. He teaches econom-
ic and social history at Gent University (Belgium). His original research area was the
rural and agricultural history of the 18th till the 20th centuries, focussing on labour and
income strategies of peasant families in Flanders. His major fields of interest are now
changing labour relations in and between families, rural crises (esp. the mid-19th cen-
tury potato crisis), life course analysis, the social stratification debate, structural history and
world-systems analysis. He is currently working on a book on the transformation of rural
society in Flanders in the 18th and 19th centuries.
MODELS AND STRUCTURES
In his description of the English working class of the mid-19th
century, Friedrich Engels expressed serious concern about the
preservation of the family: “Thus the social order makes family
life almost impossible for the worker. […] Neglect of all domestic duties, neglect of the
children, especially, is only too common among the English working-people, and only too
vigorously fostered by the existing institutions of society” 1. The fast processes of change
characterising the ‘First Industrial Revolution’ caused many contemporary commentators
to write down their impressions. From Malthus to Marx, they were all convinced that the
societal shifts they witnessed were revolutionary in nature. 
However, long-term historical research tends to minimise ‘revolutionary’ shifts. Indeed,
recent research on the interaction between family formation and the organisation of pro-
duction and work stresses both continuity and change during periods of strong economic,
social and cultural changes. Katrina Honeyman pointed out that British industrialisation
made use of the existing gender hierarchy in the work place, at the same time reconstruct-
ing the different gender roles and identities at the interface of home and work 2.
In this chapter I will look for structural changes in the relationship between work, family
and gender in 19th and 20th century Belgian society. This long-term approach only makes
sense when it looks for structures, processes and models, to reconstruct ‘the larger social
processes’ which form ‘historical time’ 3. Working with models, though, still differs from a
60 Eric Vanhaute
model-based approach. In the first case we attempt to understand social order and its evo-
lution by comparing them to other forms of social behaviour. The aim of this exercise is to
arrive at an empirical interpretation of a social system. Much attention is devoted to recur-
rence versus singularity; ‘historical time’ holds centre stage here. In the second case the
analysis of human behaviour starts from a model designed in advance. There, time is not
historical, but a background variable devoid of content. 
I will attempt to ‘historicise’ a widely-accepted social science model: the breadwinner
model. In historical and sociological literature notions like ‘the breadwinner ideology’, ‘the
breadwinner model’, ‘the breadwinner system’, ‘the breadwinner norm’, ‘the breadwinner
ideal’, ‘the breadwinner family system’, are used rather indiscriminately and smoothly,
without ever establishing when something becomes an ideology, a standard, an ideal or a
model. My ambition is not to give a universally applicable definition of these notions,
which would not make sense, given the attempt to place these concepts in their historical
context. I want to make clear, however, how a historical model, in this case the ‘bread-
winner model’, can be placed within the context of Belgian history.
I start by discussing a few definitions of production and reproduction, labour and labour
relations, especially the relations within the breadwinner model. The way in which these
notions are defined determines the outlook of social history. Afterwards I will briefly exam-
ine the issue of sources and the way in which the latter yield information. We will identi-
fy a ‘Belgian’ breadwinner model by interpreting two statistical parameters. Obviously this
is a selective angle. Finally I want to place the breadwinner model within the context of
the social dynamics of the last two centuries. I see these dynamics as the development/tran-
sition/confrontation of different historical society patterns or models.
The search for a time-scale showing the advent, the development and the decay of a bread-
winner model ‘has to be sensitive to variations by region, trade and industry’ 4. A long term
structural analysis is a complementary approach. Moreover, comparative analysis seems
indeed to be the only way to approach the mentioned variations.
PRODUCTION, REPRODUCTION AND LABOUR
Following the logic of academic disciplines, notions like family and household formation
are still thought to belong to the department of ‘demography’. In the course of many years,
demographic history has acquired an impressive knowledge about behaviour as determined
by the individual, the family or the group. A more integrated approach, more sensitive to
interaction with social and economic variables in family formation as well as to the rela-
tion with macrostructures, has proved much more complex. The rigid boundaries between
social research disciplines have always proved bothersome to demography. Thus we remain
with the consensus, explicit or implicit, that ‘demographic behaviour’ is about reproduc-
tion, whereas (wage) labour is always associated with production. This distinction has
become untenable 5. Where labour generates the survival goods required and, consequent-
ly, is necessary for ‘reproduction’, demographic choices and family life guarantee the ‘pro-
duction’ of this labour, both literally (births) and in a more figurative sense (raising chil-
dren, feeding them, providing rest, training, affection). It does not seem very sensible to
establish a hierarchy between various forms of production, they are inextricably linked.
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Hence, demographic analysis is not only a story of ‘production relations’ (man, woman,
children), but also of input (income), output (labour) and surplus value. The choices made
by men, women and families about living together, having children and raising them are
part and parcel of their general strategies about labour and income. 
The notion of labour holds centre stage in the concepts of production and reproduction.
By labour I understand each ‘productive’ human activity. Productive activity adds user
value to goods or services, however this may happen. Work or labour modes are not caused
by ‘the call of the market’. Historically most labour has taken place outside what we call
the (official) labour markets. Labour markets are therefore not natural, universal phenom-
ena, but the historically contingent products of the struggle to gain control over labour
conditions. In other words, the organisation of the labour market can only be understood
in the social context of time and place, rather than in the timeless logic of individual pref-
erences, technological stimulants, market forces or ideology 6.
As capitalist labour markets increasingly monopolise labour, the notion of labour narrows 7.
Unpaid labour, household labour, non-formal labour are excluded from the modern defini-
tion of labour. In other words, the notion of labour moves from an inclusive one to an exclu-
sive one, responding to the new, strongly segregated labour markets.
The use of labour as an exclusive notion almost always carries a connotation linked to
class, group and gender. Some productive activities receive increased value while others are
reduced in value. In this context, various forms of labour are defined antagonistically: tra-
ditional vs. modern, skilled vs. unskilled, paid vs. unpaid, individual vs. collective, male vs.
female, respectable vs. not respectable, independent vs. dependent. Such distinctions are
either based on class or group (unskilled, traditional, etc.) or based on gender (household
work, women’s labour, etc.). The exclusive connotation of labour is an ideological weapon
used to create a hierarchy among social groups and among men and women, regulating new
forms of social organisation. The way in which this happens may vary according to time
and place (nature of the capitalist organisation, core versus periphery, etc.). 
WHAT IS A BREADWINNER MODEL?
Social actors (men and women, families, social groups, businesses, government and so forth)
continually make choices within their particular societal context. Such choices constitute
the basis of strategies and behaviour. When strategies and patterns of behaviour become
standardised in particular locations and at given times, we may refer to a model. Although
a standard may leave some room for other patterns, it does set the agenda as regards demo-
graphic, social and economic issues, even right up to politics and ideology. However this
only happens when the pattern has achieved sufficient specific weight to set the agenda.
The standard model then turns into a role model, a societal standard, a point of reference.
Historians tend to investigate, not so much the standard as such, but deviations, resistance
and hidden or open deviance in relation to the standard. Obviously, this is a legitimate
enterprise, but, to my mind, it is sensible only if the standard is mapped out too. 
Each social model results from the interaction between (micro)individual choices and
(macro)societal order. Thus the model – like the breadwinner model – will be a multilay-
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ered integrated notion linking individual and family strategies to shifts in the work place
and changes in the public order. The ‘breadwinner model’ has to be understood as an inte-
grated concept which can only be studied in an approach integrating the three societal lev-
els: micro (‘the breadwinner family system’), meso (‘breadwinning’ in the workplace) and
macro (‘the breadwinner ideology’). A combined view on the interaction between indi-
vidual and family strategies, labour markets and public policies is necessary to reconstruct
‘the ways larger social structural forces constrain the repertoire of available adaptations’ 8.
A few recent contributions have revalued the breadwinner’s concept in historical
research 9. They have identified the busy scientific crossroads where research into fami-
ly relations and household labour strategies is conducted. ‘The rise of the male bread-
winner family’ confronts us with economic (the logic of capital), social (the conflict
between labour and capital, between groups of workers, between man and woman) and
political (social and tax policy) statements and especially with the need to integrate such
motivations. The debate is a strongly ideological one, often taking the shape of a capi-
talist, middle-class or male offensive. Moreover the research model includes micro-
processes (household strategies) and macrostructures (labour markets). Nevertheless (or,
perhaps, therefore) we have not seen, up to now, the emergence of an integrated vision
on the success of the breadwinner model. What are the main components of such a
breadwinner model?
– a strongly separated allocation of labour: the external, paid labour is performed by to the
male head of the family; the internal, unpaid labour is left to the housewife;
– rigid family relations, with the husband filling a paternalistic father role and acting as the
family representative on the public forum; the wife remains scarcely visible, inside the fam-
ily, the children become more dependent, among other reasons, because of compulsory
school attendance;
– at the workplace we have a strongly segregated and regulated work organisation (tay-
lorism-fordism);
– the model is fostered by an active and regulating government;
– an ideological offensive regarding the social position of men, women and children legit-
imates the new relations between the sexes.
HOW TO MAP OUT A BREADWINNER MODEL?
It is no simple matter to map out family patterns and household strategies. In the course of
many years, historical demography has accumulated vast and varied expert knowledge on
the analysis and explanation of population patterns in families and small communities.
Integrating such knowledge into economic, social and political-ideological analyses has
proved to be much more problematic. Unavoidably researchers have been using the serial
processing of average coefficients or the analysis of some cross-sections. Both methods are
rough tools. Coefficients hide the dynamics of life. Averages wipe out the variations in the
family cycle. Trends emphasise a statistically created stability and uniformity. Moreover the
main sources, i.e. the population registers, civil status registers, population censuses, are
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strongly subject to standardisation and only give a partial view of demographic behaviour
and decisions. Deviant behaviour, unconventional modes of living together, extended fam-
ily bonds… in their search for averages researchers run the risk of being blind to the great
variation of patterns of ‘living together’ among people. A classical case in point is the
obsession with the average number of family members. Extensive research demonstrates
that the average ‘density’ of the European family scarcely changed from the Middle Ages
to the early 20th Century, with the typical family numbering 4 to 5 persons. This average
hides more than it reveals. Indeed, it does not take into account the family cycle, whereby
family composition may vary considerably, nor does it look at whether or not tempo-
rary/permanent inhabitants are registered, and, last but not least, it overlooks the types of
partnership outside the conventional family pattern. We know, for instance, that the 19th
century industrialisation did not imply the confirmation of the core family. On the con-
trary, rapid economic and social change reinforced the bonds of the extended family. 
Occupational statistics are another example, based on the ‘mother’ of all statistics, the pop-
ulation census 10. If we use a broad definition of labour input, we may assume that an aver-
age of two-thirds of the population was ‘potentially’ labour-active. Occupational figures
hardly ever yield an official activity level of 65%. In Belgium in the middle of the 19th cen-
tury, this figure stood at 57%, but a hundred years later it is reduced to about 30%. Is this
a development in the ‘real world’, did half the potential active population really drop out
of the labour force? Or does this reduction rather reflect changed and narrowed counting
criteria? 
Statistics are the product of a certain reality, but simultaneously they also shape that real-
ity. They shape and are shaped and in this sense they do not differ from other sources. Paid
female labour is a case in point: it becomes increasingly invisible in the statistics between
1850 and 1950. This partially results from counting agent choice (that is, choices made by
those responsible for the counting), but it also reflects the actual process of social margin-
alisation of the labour-active woman. Sources only yield their secrets if put into context:
in time, in place and in interaction between social actors 11. 
A BREADWINNER MODEL IN BELGIUM?
The first graph (Graph 1) presents a general overview of the rates of labour participation
on – what can be called – the ‘formal labour market’. Most striking in these figures is the
growing gap, between 1850 and 1950, between the group of potentially active women
and the female participation rate in the ‘external’ labour market. In the middle of the
19th century, one out of every three women between 15 and 64 years old is part of the
‘housewife labour reservoir’. One century later, a majority of women belong to this cate-
gory. From the 1960s onwards, this long-term trend turns. Nowadays, only 29% of the
potentially active women are professionally not active, against 56% in 1950 and (maxi-
mum) 43% in 1900.
The expulsion of female labour from the formal markets affects married women first.
Around 1900 only 18% of the married women formally have a profession. In centralised
industries only 39% of the female labour force is over 21 years old, and barely 17% is mar-
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ried. In 1950 over 40% of the women in the age group of 15 to 24 years is active in the
labour market (the figure for men is 75%), a ratio that drops to below 30% in the age group
of 25 to 34 years (men: +90%). This means that less than three out of ten women in that
age group are professionally active. Four decades later this participation ratio has risen to
more than eighty percent. This re-entry of women in the labour market is first of all the re-
entry of married women. In 1950 only 15% of all married women are active on the labour
market, while in 1990 the figure rises to 60%. Nowadays the majority of women who re-
enter the labour market are older than 35 years old. Due to the expansion of part-time
work, the increase of the total female labour input is smaller. Almost half of the active
women do not have a full-time job (44%), whereas only a small fraction of their male part-
ners (16%) have a part-time job 13.
Graph 2 shows the women’s share of the official labour market, as a total and then subdi-
vided according to the three classical sectors. In general, the women’s share has decreased
from 42% of the registered active people in 1850 (with a very equal distribution over the
three sectors) to 28% a century later. Today this share has risen again to almost 40%. The
drop in the official labour participation of women occurred first in the industrial sector,
with the marginalisation of the production in cottage industries, but also, in the late 19th
century, with the expulsion of women from the factories. However, the same period saw the
feminisation of the expanding trade and services sector (especially with the strong growth
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Graph 1. Registered labour participation in Belgium, 1850-1990, based on professional censuses. Percent of
population 15-64 years old 12.
in the numbers of female servants). After 1900 women also lost ground in agriculture and
the tertiary sector. The last column shows that the re-entry of women into the official
labour market after 1950 was almost exclusively in the service sector. Again, as in 1900,
women constitute the majority of workers there.
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Graph 2. Women’s share on the registered labour market. Belgium, 1850-1990.
The ratios of labour participation point at an exclusion of the ‘housewife’ from the formal
labour market between 1850 and 1950, and, perhaps, to an advance of the breadwinner
family. Can this be confirmed by budget inquiries?
Until the first half of the 20th century, the wage income is a shared responsibility of all
family members. Throughout the 19th century, the weight of the female wage is decreas-
ing. This is compensated, first, by an increase of the earnings of the children, and from the
end of the century onwards, by higher male wages. What is striking for the first half of the
20th century is not only the marginalisation of wage income from wife and children, but,
even more so, the sharp increase of non-wage income. Public allowances and returns of
savings and investments diminish the share of the male pay-packet in the family budget.
After 1950, the re-entry of the housewife on the external labour market is reflected in a
higher share of the female wage.
These figures too point at the predominance, in the first half of the 20th century, of the
breadwinner family. But the data can be read in a different way. In fact, the male wage
never represented more than three quarters, and in most cases, not more than two thirds
of the total family income. 
In ‘regular’ working-class families, the male wage-packet was never large enough to make
family ends meet (graph 4). Before the interwar period, extra income via the earnings of
wife and children was necessary. The retreat of young and female workers from the formal
labour markets was only possible after a massive public subsidising of the family budget (or
the male wage) through a range of allowances (family allowances, unemployment benefits,
health insurance, pension allowances) and tax benefits. The relatively fast rise of the male
wage from the end of the century onwards encouraged the withdrawal of women and young
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children from the external labour market, however, without ever reaching the level of the
‘family wage’ 15. The re-entry of the married partner in the labour market has had a strong
effect on the living standard. In roughly the last two decades, the households with two
wage earners have set a new standard of consumption 16. 
The removal of women from the registered labour market from the second half of 19th cen-
tury mainly boils down to the expulsion of married women. In 1900 only one out of every
five married women was officially occupationally active, undoubtedly a substantial reduc-
tion compared to half a century earlier (although we are unable to supply general figures
here). This movement goes hand in hand with a more explicit ‘protective’ attitude of leg-
islators toward the married housewife. After a long preparatory phase during the last
decades of the 19th century, 1919 saw the voting of the first comprehensive law restricting
(paid) female and child labour. The family had to be protected from excessive absence by
the mother. During the recession of the thirties the formal labour participation of women
dropped to an all-time low. In 1934-1935 there was an unusually intensive legislative activ-
ity to limit the presence of women on the labour market: per company, a quota of female
labour was established, a recruitment ban was decreed for women in government depart-
ments and agencies, jobless women and jobless partners of working women no longer
received benefits, or if they did, lower ones, and tax policy summed the income of married
couples. This deterrence policy was continued after World War II, but now especially
through ‘rewarding’ the housewife. Mothers without independent income received a ‘fam-
ily benefit’ and higher child benefits.
By 1950 the level of female participation had dropped to a mere 15%. On the other hand,
the re-entry of women on the labour market during the last three decades also mainly con-
cerned married women. Today half of them are again occupationally active. This change
matches a u-turn in government policy. From the second half of the 1950s the Belgian
economy went into a fast growth, causing an enormous demand for additional labour. Now
wage labour by women had to be stimulated. First the benefits for housewives were abol-
ished and then the system of discriminatory unemployment benefits. The law of 1967 on
child and female labour no longer sought to discourage working women, but rather to ‘pro-
tect’ them. This led, among other things, to compulsory maternity leave and the restric-
tion of employers’ right to fire the employees concerned. The year 1975 is a milestone in
the painfully slow process to achieve equal treatment of men and women in the work place.
The Belgian government put into practice a European directive setting a general ban on
wage discrimination in any shape or form based on gender. Three years later this discrimi-
nation ban was extended to the whole field of labour (labour conditions, vocational train-
ing, career opportunities, etc.). During the 1980s this principle of equality was further
developed, with the introduction of parents’ leave, career break schemes, positive actions
to recruit women. The 1988 tax reform law separated the incomes of partners in two-earn-
er families, thereby removing the tax ‘disincentive’ on the second wage earner (the woman
in most cases). 
The above analysis leads to the following conclusions. First we observe that the accelerat-
ed entry of women in the formal labour market during the last two to three decades is not
unprecedented, but, in a sense, a return to an earlier, more general pattern. Moreover, even
in the age of the breadwinner model and government disincentives – during the second
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and third quarter of the 20th century – a substantial part of the women remained formally
active: one out of three potentially active women, one out of seven married women. Here
we necessarily have to leave out much labour done in the uncharted informal and tax-hid-
den labour circuits.
Thirdly the breadwinner model could only be generalised through massive government
subsidies. Part of the expenses of households was ‘collectivised’ through a system of direct
and indirect public financing.
FROM AN EXTENSIVE TO AN INTENSIVE LABOUR MODEL
Any analysis of changing labour relations has to be linked to the successive phases in the
process of capital accumulation, that is, contextualised in changing historical time. The
history of capitalist accumulation is marked by successive periods of transformation and
stabilisation. In Belgium’s economic and social history we can trace three such periods in
the last two centuries.
The transition to 19th century industrial society goes hand in hand with a deregulation on
all societal levels. The ‘extensive’ production model of the first industrial revolution is
based on low individual wages and a high labour turnover. The female participation in the
‘external’ labour market has never been higher, except for the last decades, than in the first
half of the 19th century 17. Labour input per worker is more intensive than in the periods
before and after 18. In the Ghent cotton industry in 1816 only 30% of the labour force were
men older than 16. In 1846 one quarter of the workers was younger than 16, a percentage
which only slowly decreased after 1870 19. Women in contrast strengthened their presence
in the textile factories, from 34% in 1846 to 50% in 1910. Adult male workers were never
the majority in 19th century Ghent textile industry 20. Female and child labour was no pre-
rogative of textile towns. In Antwerp, the expansion of a commercial economy was accom-
panied by the withdrawal of working women in the unstable labour markets of ‘sweating’
industries, personal services and other casual labour 21. Female (and child) labour was mas-
sive, cheap, flexible and reliable and was the main ‘buffer’ against the uncertainties of the
rapidly growing industrial capitalist system, both within the household and as ‘a reserve
army’ on the labour market 22.
The deterioration of labour and income prospects in both rural and urban societies narrows
the margins of family formation. In spite of an intensification of female and child labour
participation, certainly in the first decades of the industrial revolution, the balance in fam-
ily budgets was more fragile than before. The gradual substitution of a home-based
production model by open and unstable labour markets blocked the perspectives of mar-
riage and ‘regular’ family formation for a growing number of adults. In the expanding city
the protective functions of the household became more and more the responsibility of
broader networks 23. Public authorities, especially in Belgium, followed the liberal adage of
non-intervention. Until the beginning of the 20th century a central social policy was
almost non-existent 24.
The last quarter of the 19th century marked a new turning point in the history of western
society. Together with a ‘second industrial revolution’, a new societal model of increasing
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regulation took shape. The bottleneck of the ‘19th century model’, the exhaustion of the
labour market and the family reproductive capacities, was avoided thanks to the transition
to an ‘intensive’ model based on higher male wages, protective legislation (banning women
and children from heavy industrial sectors), better schooling, a higher quality of housing
and living. The housewife was forced to withdraw to unprotected/informal niches of the
labour market (domestic service, ‘sweating’, industries, agriculture) and, during the inter-
war period, to household labour. The development of a public transfer system of family
allowances and tax benefits was the final step in the realisation of the myth of the
breadwinner wage. The costs of capitalist growth were more and more ‘externalised’, borne
by the public governments. 
The marriage market opened up, followed by a restriction of the fertility rate.
In short, this period was marked by:
a) The withdrawal of the (married) woman from the formal labour market. The participa-
tion rate of women between 15 and 65 years old dropped from 67% in 1850 to 39% a cen-
tury later. In 1900 already 43% of the ‘potentially active’ women were registered without a
official occupation, against only 3% of their male counterparts.
b) A sector-based segregation in the labour market. The decline of the female labour par-
ticipation was sharpest in the strong and in the new industries 25. On the other hand,
women exercising market activities were over-represented in more invisible sectors such as
cottage industries (‘sweating’ industries such as lace-making and clothing), personal ser-
vices and family farm labour. The ‘gendering of jobs’ was accompanied by segregation with-
in the female labour force. About 1900 two thirds of the unmarried female industrial work-
ers were factory labourers, one third was engaged in cottage industries. For married women
the ratios were reversed. In 1896 61% of all workers in cottage industries were female, in
1910 this was already 76%. Until World War I, an ever increasing part of the young female
labour reservoir was drawn into the sector of the personal services. Between 1850 and 1910
the number of (rural) maids serving in urban households quadrupled. More than 80% was
not married. In the 20th century, the group of domestic servants systematically shrank,
strongly accelerating the diminution of the labour possibilities for women.
c) The institutionalisation of the relations of dependence via a dual process of discourag-
ing or restricting female access to an (external) job, and by denying women equal treat-
ment in public insurance 26.
d) The ideologisation of breadwinner and household labour. This had mainly a ‘megaphone’-
function, through the male dominated labour movements 27, through justifying initiatives for
protective legislation 28, through the propaganda of hygienist movements, the professionali-
sation of ‘housewifery’ in schools, the rhetoric of nationalist movements, and so forth.
All are different sides of the same picture. The segregation of the labour market along gen-
der lines goes hand in hand with the ousting of women from the formal labour market, in
the first place married women, in the interwar period also unmarried girls. In 1950 the par-
ticipation rate of girls between 15 and 24 years had dropped to 40% (men: 75%). In the
age group 25-34 years the ratio was below 30%, while more than 90% of the men of the
same age had a registered occupation.
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The public policy of subsidising the breadwinner family was promoted by an ideologically
based construction of a gendered labour concept, along the lines of external and internal,
or paid and unpaid labour. In the words of Honeyman and Goodman 29: “marital status took
on a new significance as protective legislation, the cult of the family wage, and the ideol-
ogy of domesticity interacted to emphasise gender inequality in the labour market”.
A NEW TRANSITION
During the last quarter of the 20th century the single-earner model quickly lost its attrac-
tion. It is significant to see the re-emergence of ‘looser’ relations in three societal fields: the
weakening of the strict social relations linked to the regulated consociational economy, the
deregulation in the work place and freer choices regarding modes of living together. The
end of the 20th century’s bipolar labour model goes hand in hand with a greater diversity
in labour, income and cohabitation forms. Where the traditional ‘breadwinner model’ rest-
ed on the foundation of a ‘passive welfare state’ (with low labour participation and high
social protection), the last two decades have seen an unmistakable shift to an ‘active com-
bination model’ 30. This new project seeks to combine high (male and female) labour par-
ticipation with high social protection. This happens simultaneously with fundamental
shifts in the work place, in government actions and within households. More flexible mod-
els replace the rigid Taylor-Ford type labour organisation. Recently the government has
been resolutely reducing participation-inhibiting measures (in tax and social security poli-
cies, etc.) and embarking on an ‘activating’ policy. The ‘traditional’ family has been losing
ground increasingly, with various types of cohabitation being combined again in the course
of people’s lives. In 1991 one household out of three no longer matched the ‘traditional’
two-partner model. In 1950 unconventional cohabitation only occurred in one out of
every six cases. Moreover the trend toward a more equal internal and external division of
labour is moving ahead. Children will again become active partners in the upbringing and
cohabitation process.
Since the 1960s, (married) women have re-appeared on the labour market, applying for
jobs in new industries and the services sector. The ‘housewife labour reservoir’ (the num-
ber of potentially active women [16-64 years old] who have no official occupation, are not
officially unemployed, and do not have the status of student or pensioner) shrank from
almost 50% in 1950 to barely 10% at the end of the 1990’s. This re-entry seems to have
been a ‘lever’ for the entrepreneurs to deregulate the labour market (irregular and part-time
work). After a century-long trend of modulating household income patterns towards the
breadwinner/housewife model, the two last decades of the 20th century show a new vari-
ety in household labour and income patterns. These seem to be closely linked to the
income level. Households in the lowest income quarter depend mostly upon social securi-
ty subventions (65%), much more than on income from labour or savings (each 17%) 31.
For households from the highest income quarter, labour wages amount to 75% of the
household income, against 14% from social security and 11% from savings. Families with
at least two wages depend for more than 80% on their labour income. Contrary to the for-
mer century, this means a higher and more secure income status. Again, a new labour and
income standard is set by the upper middle classes.
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HISTORICAL MODELS AND HISTORICAL TIME
The breadwinner model is a symbol of the 20th century social order, not only in Belgium,
but also in the rest of Western Europe. This model, which has its roots in the closing
decades of the 19th century will probably last into the first quarter of the 21st century. The
20th century family model replaced the deregulated pattern established in the wake of the
first industrial capitalist acceleration. The breadwinner model is not only a model because
it exhibits the characteristics of an empirical-logical system, but also because it has an
‘exemplary’ value. Therefore any model is something of a myth, in view of its ‘recruiting’
and ‘hiding’ character. It is a concealing myth, because, in narrowing the definition of the
labour market, it hides many female tasks from formal, statistical government registration.
As a myth, it is also ‘recruiting’, because the model has been used as an ideological tool to
impose a particular gender model on society and households. Here I refer not only to the
old social and political elites, but also to the new emancipating ‘middle groups’: the lower
middle classes, the lower clergy and teachers, the worker elites leading the rising social
movements. 
The central link in the analysis of the rise and decline of the breadwinner model is the
household, or, to put it more accurately, the totality of choices made within the household.
There lies the junction where individual aspirations, gender relations, entrepreneurial
strategies as well as ideological standards meet. An integrating research model can only be
built up upon a systematic and comparative reconstruction of ‘the breadwinner model’ in
a series of regions and countries according the centre-periphery division 32. This geograph-
ical analysis should be linked to the different phases (acceleration and deceleration) in the
growth of capitalist production. That is how the concept of family strategies can be made
operational within the framework of a changing ‘historical time’.
After 1750 western labour history is marked by three periods of transition, which outline
labour organisation for the next ‘long century’ 33. These periods are marked by accelerated
changes in capital accumulation, labour organisation, household formation, gender rela-
tions and normative regulation. The first period is characterised by the deregulation of
labour markets and household structures and a privatisation (de-collectivisation) of social
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Graph 5. The timing of historical models in
Belgium, 19th - 20th centuries.
relations. This goes hand in hand with an ideological offensive of economic liberalisation
and social disciplining. From the last decades of the 19th century, measures to promote
protective legislation and a new ideology of the breadwinner-and-housewife-model go
hand in hand with a more rigorous labour organisation. The trend is towards a more regu-
lated societal model, on a macro-level (a fordist government policy), on a meso-level (a
taylorist labour organisation) and on a micro-level (a patriarchal household organisation). 
This regulated and collectivist model is unsettled again in the last two decades of the 20th
century, when a new acceleration in the capitalist accumulation model generates a new de-
regulation and de-collectivisation. New forms of flexible production are backed by a less
stringent labour legislation, the fragmentation of household patterns, the individualisation
of consumption and formerly collective life transitions, and the commercialisation of
leisure. As Saskia Sassen argues, this new phase in the globalisation of capitalism generates
a ‘movement to a more informal modus operandi’ of economic production, which stimu-
lates a rising demand for flexible, non-regulated and therefore more easily exploitative
forms of family, female and immigrant labour 34. 
Comparative research demonstrates that there is no such thing as a simple set of circum-
stances which generated the male breadwinner family 35. However comparative research
should be sensitive to the wider outline of historical time as well as to the periods of shifts
and transitions shaping such times. Any research project aiming at a comparative analysis
over time and space has to bridge the periods of transition 36. Moreover it has to integrate
the changes in the social concepts that order and transform societies: household, group,
class, gender, labour, social movement etc. 37. Without doubt, this will be the hardest nut
to crack.
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